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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
MEDICAL TREATISES AS EVIDENCE IN COURT AND IN
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION PROCEEDINGS
Medical evidence is often an important source of proof for litigants in both
workmen's compensation proceedings and court trials. In attempting to present
persuasive proof of their claims, parties have often sought to use authoritative
medical treatises. This, in turn, has raised the question of the applicability of
the hearsay rule to the introduction of such evidence.'
Exclusion of evidence under the hearsay rule is generally based upon four
arguments: (1) that such evidence is not subject to the solemnity of a court-
administered oath; (2) that it is impossible for the trier of fact to test the
authority's credibility by observing his demeanor as could be done with a
witness; (3) that the hearsay may be inaccurately reported to the triers of fact;
and (4) most importantly, that there is no opportunity for cross-examination
of the person whose opinion is being offered.2 These arguments are compelling
where oral hearsay is offered at trial. But where written hearsay is offered, the
case for exclusion is less persuasive, especially when an authoritative treatise
is offered in conjunction with expert opinion evidence. Moreover, when the
treatise is sought to be used in a workmen's compensation proceeding rather
than a court trial, the arguments against admission lose much of their vitality.
This is particularly true where an expert witness is present at such a proceeding.
Medical Treatises as Evidence at Trial
The question of whether medical treatises should be admitted at trial is
separable into two more specific questions. First, should medical treatises be
admitted as independent evidence without corroboration by expert testimony?
Second, if not independently admissible, should they be admitted in conjunction
with expert opinion evidence?
Admissibility Without Corroboration. The rule excluding hearsay evidence
has generally been applied not only to oral testimony but also to written evidence,
including treatises by acknowledged authorities.3 The soundness of the applica-
tion of this rule to authoritative writings is questionable. The introduction of
treatises causes no serious problem concerning accuracy of presentation, because
it is clear that the precise words of the author are being presented.4 Since it is
likely that the treatise will have been written long before the accrual of the
cause of action, it would probably not have been written with a view to the
litigation. It is therefore not necessary to be concerned that the evidence is not
subject to oath or that the author's demeanor cannot be observed. 5 Although
1 Gallagher v. Market St. Ry., 67 Cal. 13, 6 Pac. 869 (1885); Ashworth v. Kittridge,
66 Mass. 193 (1853); People v. Hall, 48 Mich. 482, 12 N.W. 665 (1882); Eckleberry v.
Kaiser Foundation Northern Hosps., 226 Ore. 616, 359 P.2d 1090 (1961); cases cited in
Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 1338, 1341-43 (1962); Comment, "Medical Textbooks in the Court-
room," 2 U.C.LA.L. Rev. 252 (1955).
2 McCormick, Evidence § 224 (1954); 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1362 (3d ed. 1940).
3 See, e.g., Isley v. Little, 219 Ga. 23, 131 S.E.2d 623 (1963); Edwards v. Union Buffalo
Mills Co., 162 S.C. 17, 159 S.E. 818 (1931).
4 In Davis v. Arkansas Best Freight Sys., Inc., 393 S.W.2d 237 (Ark. 1965), the doctor,
testifying in a workmen's compensation proceeding, read from a copy of an excerpt taken
from a medical text. Possible inaccuracy of the presentation might still be a matter for
concern in such a case.
5 See 6 Wigmore, supra note 2, § 1692.
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it is possible that the jury could be confused or misled by the presentation of
technical or outdated material, 6 or of excerpts read out of context, these dangers
can be reduced if counsel for the opposing party calls an expert witness.7 It is
debatable, however, whether the burden of obtaining such witnesses should be
shifted to the other party in this manner.
The cross-examination argument, however, retains its persuasiveness as applied
to the independent introduction of a treatise.8 The opposing counsel has no
opportunity to test by cross-examination the process of reasoning and experi-
mentation which was employed in reaching particular conclusions9 or to ask the
author whether he still believes those conclusions to be valid.10 The total lack
of opportunity for cross-examination makes the admission of authoritative
writings at trial without expert corroboration undesirable.
Alabama is the only state which, as a matter of common law, has generally
admitted written hearsay so long as the facts are relevant to the issue of the case
being tried. 1 Though some states have enacted statutes which make historical
works and books of science and art written by "persons indifferent between the
parties . . . prima facie evidence of facts of general notoriety and interest,' 21
medical treatises do not meet the "general notoriety and interest" requirement.13
Some states have statutes permitting medical books to be introduced in mal-
practice cases if the author is a recognized expert in his profession.14
Admissibility in Support of Expert Opinion Evidence. The argument that
medical treatises should not be admissible because the author is not available
for cross-examination loses much of its vitality when the writing is used only
in conjunction with an expert's opinion and the opposing party is given adequate
6 See Gallagher v. Market St. Ry., supra note 1; Huffman v. Click, 77 N.C. 55, 57 (1877);
St. Louis, A. & T. Ry. v. Jones, 14 S.W. 309 (Tex. 1890), all involving outdated material.
The argument for inadmissibility based on this possibility is applicable to the use of all
scientific evidence, including opinion testimony itself. 6 Wigmore, supra note 2, § 1690. See
Ruth v. Fenchel, 37 N.J. Super. 295, 315, 117 A.2d 284, 295 (App. Div. 1955), aff'd, 21
N.J. 171, 121 A.2d 373 (1956).
For discussion to the effect that technical language is a factor weighing against admissibility,
see Bixby v. Omaha & C. B. Ry. & Bridge Co., 105 Iowa 293, 75 N.W. 182 (1898); Ashworth
v. Kittridge, supra note 1, at 195; People v. Hall, supra note 1.
7 Ruth v. Fenchel, supra note 6, at 314-16, 117 A.2d at 295; 6 Wigmore, supra note 2, §
1690, at 4.8 Gallagher v. Market St. Ry., 67 Cal. 13, 6 Pac. 869 (1885); Bixby v. Omaha & C. B. Ry.
& Bridge Co., supra note 6. Ashworth v. Kittridge, 66 Mass. 193 (1853); People v. Hall,
48 Mich. 482, 12 N.W. 665 (1882); Tucker v. Donald, 60 Miss. 460 (1882); Eckleberry v.
Kaiser Foundation Northern Hosps., 226 Ore. 616, 359 P.2d 1090 (1961).
9 See Danville & I. H. R.R. v. Tidrick, 137 Ill. App. 553 (1907); Mattfeld v. Nester, 226
Minn. 106, 32 N.W.2d 291 (1948); St. Louis, A. & T. Ry. v. Jones, supra note 6.
10 See Ashworth v. Kittridge, supra note 8, at 194; Huffman v. Click, supra note 6.
11 See City of Dothan v. Hardy, 237 Ala. 603, 188 So. 264 (1939); Burns v. State, 226
Ala. 117, 145 So. 436 (1932); Watkins v. Potts, 219 Ala. 427, 122 So. 416 (1929); Batson
v. Batson, 217 Ala. 450, 117 So. 10 (1928).
12 E.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1936, replaced without change by Cal. Evid. Code § 1341
(effective Jan. 1, 1961). Similar provisions may be found in several other states. Ala. Code
tit. 7, § 413 (1960); Idaho Code Ann. § 9-402 (1948); Iowa Code Ann. § 622.23 (1950);
Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 93-1101-8 (1964); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1218 (1964); Ore. Rev.
Stat. § 41.670 (1965); Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-6 (1953).
13 Union Pac. Ry. v. Yates, 79 Fed. 584 (8th Cir. 1897); Gallagher v. Market St. Ry.,
supra note 8; Bixby v. Omaha & C. B. Ry. & Bridge Co., 105 Iowa 293, 75 N.W. 182
(1898). But see the cases cited in note 11 supra.
14 See Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 233, § 79C (1956), applied in Thomas v. Ellis, 329 Mass. 93,
106 N.E.2d 687 (1952); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 51.040 (1963), applied in Foreman v. Ver
Brugghen, 81 Nev. 86, 398 P.2d 993 (1965). a
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notice of its intended use. For this reason, some states permit this limited use
of medical treatises at trial. New Jersey has recently adopted a new court rule
which provides that "an expert witness may refer to and read excerpts from
learned treatises in support of his testimony provided notice is given before
trial when reference thereto in the direct testimony is contemplated."' 5 South
Carolina has a statutory provision of very limited scope which makes medical
books admissible where there is an expert available for testimony and "the
question of sanity or insanity or the administration of poison or any other article
destructive of life is involved. .. ."16 It appears that the case law of Connecticut
gives the trial court discretion as to whether medical texts may be read to the
court or jury for the purpose of supporting an expert's testimony.17 Also, as
pointed out above, Alabama's case law permits the admission of written hearsay
generally1s
Usually, however, the actual reading of medical treatises in connection with
an expert's opinion evidence is not permitted.' 9 The author is still not available
to disclose the basis for his conclusions or any possible change in his views,
nor can he guarantee that his conclusions would necessarily follow in the exact
factual situation of the case being tried.2 0 On the other hand, the expert witness
himself is available to explain the technicalities and to be cross-examined about
the conclusions of the author. This argument supports the view permitting the
reading of excerpts from medical treatises so long as an expert is present. Under
this approach, the evidence is admissible regardless of whether the expert
originally utilized the treatise to support his conclusions, or is merely present
for the purpose of corroborating the statements in the treatise where it was
introduced into evidence by counsel.
Since cross-examination of the expert witness might not be as complete as
cross-examination of the author, additional safeguards are needed. These can
be supplied by the "necessity" and "trustworthiness" tests. Courts have
established exceptions to the hearsay rule for certain types of situations where
both of these tests are met.
21
The principle of "necessity" is concerned with the value of evidence to the
party introducing it. There is no requirement that it be the only possible evidence
on the particular point; there need not be the threat of the entire loss of a
person's evidence in order that necessity be found, "but merely of some valuable
source of evidence."2 2 The presence of an expert witness, therefore, does not
make the principle inapplicable. Where the author of a treatise is unavailable or
15 N.J. Rule of Evidence 63(31) (codified with NJ. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:84A-1-32 (Supp.
1965)). Compare Uniform Rule of Evidence 63(31) which makes admissible:
A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of . . . science ... to prove the
matter stated therein if the judge takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject
testifies, that the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is a reliable authority in the subject.
16 S.C. Code Ann. § 26-142 (1962). See Edwards v. Union Buffalo Mills Co., 162 S.C. 17,
159 S.E. 818 (1931); Baker v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 161 S.C. 479, 159 S.E. 822 (1931).
17 See Kaplan v. Mashkin Freight Lines, Inc., 146 Conn. 327, 150 A.2d 602 (1959)
(dictum), citing Richmond's Appeal, 59 Conn. 226, 22 Ati. 82 (1890).
18 See note 11 supra, and accompanying text.
19 See, e.g., Brown v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 135 Cal. App. 2d 709, 287 P.2d 810
(Dist. Ct. App. 1955); State v. Baldwin, 36 Kan. 1, 12 Pac. 318 (1886).
20 Huffman v. Click, 77 N.C. 55, 58 (1877).
21 5 Wigmore, supra note 2, §§ 1421-22; 6 Wigmore, supra note 2, §§ 1691-92. See Dallas
County v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961).
22 5 Wigmore, upra note 2, § 1421.
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the cost to the litigant of securing his testimony would to too high (as would
usually be the case), it should be possible for the book, if trustworthy, to be
read in the author's absence.23 If he is one of the foremost authorities on his
subject, his treatise should easily qualify as a valuable source of evidence.
Moreover, the medical expert usually bases his testimony on the writings of the
eminent members of his profession anyway. 24
[Bly the very exclusion of material deemed hearsay, often as the result of
rather legalistic, technical reasoning, much that is of value to the doctor
in his practice and to the court in the determination of the medical facts
of the case is lost.25
The test of "trustworthiness" involves both sincerity and accuracy.26 While
eminent writers may have a bias in favor of a theory, "it is a bias in favor of
the truth as they see it; it is not a bias in favor of a lawsuit or of an individual."2 7
Hence, they can be considered sincere. Moreover, the author of a learned treatise
is concerned about accuracy since he "knows that every conclusion will be
subjected to careful professional criticism, and is open ultimately to certain
refutation if not well-founded ... .,,28 It has been said that these writers are
at least as trustworthy unsworn and unexamined in court as witnesses who
receive a payment from one of the litigants for their appearance.29
Although it could be argued that the "necessity" and "trustworthiness" tests
would also be satisfied where the treatise is introduced as independent evidence,
the lack of an available expert witness would still prevent the clarification of
technical passages and the cross-examination of anyone knowledgeable in the
subject. Hence, these tests provide sufficient safeguards only when supporting
evidence is furnished.
Assuming, then, that the trustworthiness and value of the treatise and the
presence of an expert other than the author overcome the cross-examination
argument, concern might still be expressed over the reading's psychological effect
on triers of fact who do not possess expertise regarding the subject matter.
23 Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., supra note 21, at 396; Ruth v. Fenchel,
37 N.J. Super. 295, 318, 117 A.2d 284, 297 (App. Div. 1955), aff'd 21 N.J. 171, 121 A.2d
373 (1956). While the broad language of the appellate division in Ruth was not adopted
by the New Jersey Supreme Court opinion, which affirmed the holding permitting use of
medical treatises on cross-examination, the dictum of the appellate division was given effect
by the adoption NJ. Rule of Evidence 63(31); see note 15 supra.
24 6 Wigmore, supra note 2, § 1691:
The proper rule would be for the Court to allow the use of a printed treatise, approved
and read aloud by a witness expert in that subject, unless in its discretion, considering
all the circumstances, the author if available should be summoned. In practice, the
Courts which allow the use of learned treatises apparently do not impose any such
condition.
See Ruth v. Fenchel, supra note 23, at 314, 117 A.2d at 294; Rheingold, "The Basis of
Medical Testimony," 15 Vand. L. Rev. 473, 482-86 (1962).
With respect to the author's qualifications, it might be necessary to show that he is
regarded as an authority in his field before excerpts from his book could be read. See
Ruth v. Fenchel, supra note 23, at 315, 117 A.2d at 295.
25 Rheingold, supra note 24, at 527.
26 Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., supra note 21, at 397.
27 6 Wigmore, supra note 2, § 1692. See Ruth v. Fenchel, supra note 23, at 313, 117 A.2d
at 294.
28 6 Wigmore, supra note 2, § 1692. See 5 Wigmore, supra note 2, § 1422.
29 6 Wigmore, supra note 2, § 1692, quoted in Ruth v. Fenchel, 37 N.J. Super. 295, 313,
117 A.2d 284, 294 (App. Div. 1955).
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Where the mere statement by an expert witness might not be accepted as
conclusive, reading from the work of an authority might have a great influence
on the jury or the trial judge. This argument is relied upon primarily where an
expert is available for testimony in court and the authoritative work is not
needed as the sole source of evidence. Whether such influence is undue, as has
been charged,30 depends on whether the reading of treatises is justifiable under
the tests of "necessity" and "trustworthiness." Once it is agreed that such
justification exists, there is no problem in allowing the expert and the authorita-
tive source to provide a unified presentation with whatever influence it might
have.
There is another major reason why the general rule-that medical treatises
are inadmissible to support expert opinion evidence-may be undesirable. It is
established that where an expert corroborates his opinion by merely referring
to scientific authorities, such reference is not deemed an introduction of the
source into evidence and is therefore permitted.3 ' Since the conclusion as stated
by the expert will often, when combined with the fact that he has derived his
own conclusion from the writing, indicate the substance of the writing, a rule
prohibiting the reading or summarizing of treatises seems to create a distinction
in theory where in practical effect there may be no difference.32
Medical Treatises as Evidence in Workmen's Compensation Proceedings
Admissibility. Even though, with the exception of Alabama, authoritative
medical writings are not admissible at trial as independent evidence and in
most states cannot be read at trial to support the opinions of expert wit-
nesses, this is usually not the case in workmen's compensation proceedings. The
nature of these proceedings makes the argument for admissibility much stronger.
The workmen's compensation acts are intended to provide a proceeding which
is as simple, inexpensive, and informal as possible.3 3 In accordance with this
philosophy, over half the states have enacted provisions which liberalize the rules
30 See Huffman v. Click, 77 N.C. 55, 58 (1877). Cf. Osborn, The Problem of Proof 87
(1926), where the importance of reputation in the persuasion process is emphasized. But
see Maguire & Hahesy, "Requisite Proof of Basis for Expert Opinion," 5 Vand. L. Rev. 432,
440 (1952), where the argument is criticized.
31 Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Meyer, 106 Ark. 91, 152 S.W. 995 (1912); Healy v. Visalia &
T. R.R., 101 Cal. 585, 36 Pac. 125 (1894) ; State v. Baldwin, 36 Kan. 1, 12 Pac. 318 (1886);
Scott v. Astoria R.R., 43 Ore. 26, 72 Pac. 594 (1903).
32 See Comment, 12 So. Calif. L. Rev. 424, 428 (1939). In Eagleston v. Rowley, 172 F.2d
202 (9th Cir. 1949), the Ninth Circuit permitted much more than mere reference. The
court held that it was not reversible error for the trial court to permit the reading of
excerpts from a medical treatise as long as there would still be sufficient evidence if the
excerpt bad not been read. Eagleston involved a nonjury trial. Thus, while the decision
was not expressly limited to such trials, it leaves open the possibility that a jury-nonjury
trial distinction will be drawn. See also, Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Meyer, supra note 31, where
the Arkansas Supreme Court permitted the witness to summarize the source cited.
33 See, e.g., Ex parte Puritan Baking Co., 208 Ala. 373, 94 So. 347 (1922); Long-Bell
Lumber Co. v. Mitchell, 206 Ark. 854, 177 S.W.2d 920 (1944); State Compensation Ins.
Fund v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 20 Cal. 2d 264, 125 P.2d 42 (1942); Shepard v. Carnation
Milk Co., 220 Iowa 466, 262 N.W. 110 (1935); State ex rel. Morgan v. Industrial Acc. Bd.,
130 Mont. 272, 300 P.2d 954 (1956); Streng's Piece Dye Works, Inc. v. Galasso, 14 N.J.
Misc. 801, 187 At. 566 (Sup. Ct. 1936), aff'd, 118 N.J.L. 257, 191 Ati. 874 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1937); Bigby v. Pelican Bay Lumber Co., 173 Ore. 682, 147 P.2d 199 (1944); Crane
Co. v. Jamieson, 192 Tenn. 41, 237 S.W.2d 546 (1951); Woolsey v. Panhandle Ref. Co., 131
Tex. 449, 116 S.W.2d 675 (1938); Schneider Fuel & Supply Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 224
Wis. 298, 272 N.W. 25 (1937); 1 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation § 3, at 7-8 (3d ed.
1941).
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of evidence for these proceedings.3 4 Some of the statutes provide that the com-
mission is not bound by common-law rules of evidence; 35 others state that the
commission is not bound by the technical rules of evidence; 36 and yet others per-
mit "process and procedure" to be "as simple and summary as reasonably may
be."37
In the workmen's compensation proceeding there is often the added safe-
guard of a trier of fact who has himself developed expertise.38 The commissioner
or referee, having acquired a familiarity with the problems and issues involved,
may be better able to judge for himself which medical statements might be
accurate and what weight should be given to the excerpts read and the opinions
which they support. He probably would be less confused than jurors and trial
judges by technical language used by the authorities. Because of his expertise,
he may be better able than a juror or trial judge to separate relevant from
irrelevant evidence. 39 It is therefore of little concern that irrelevant evidence
might be admitted under the liberal evidentiary rules. While the statutes provide
no basis for distinguishing independent hearsay from corroborated hearsay, the
same reasons given for requiring an expert at trial would further strengthen
the case for allowing the reading from medical books in compensation pro-
ceedings if an expert is present.
Ability To Support Award. Appellate courts in some states have greatly lim-
ited the effectiveness of legislation liberalizing the rules on admissibility of evi-
dence in workmen's compensation proceedings. This has been done by limiting
the weight which the workmen's compensation commission may accord hearsay.
The California rule makes hearsay both admissible and capable of supporting an
award,40 thus giving full support to the legislative purpose. But under the New
York rule, followed by a majority of states,41 hearsay evidence is admissible but
by itself cannot support an award. This rule requires that there be a "residuum"
of legal evidence which provides some support for the claim before an award
34 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 79.30 (1961). See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 23-942 (1956); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1327 (1960); Cal. Labor Code § 5708; Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 44-523 (1964); NJ. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-56 (1959); N.Y. Workmen's Comp.
Law § 118; Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-88 (1953); cf. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:1317 (1964)
(court trials for disputed claims).
35 See Horovitz, Workmen's Compensation 239 (1944), where the author lists the states
of Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, Utah, Vermont
and West Virginia; see Cal. Labor Code § 5708; NJ. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-56 (1959); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 4123.10 (Page 1965).
36 See Horovitz, supra note 35, where Kansas, Missouri, Montana, and Pennsylvania are
listed; see Ark. Stat. Ann. 81-1327 (1960).
37 See Horovitz, supra note 35, at 242, where the author lists the states of Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia.
Also, see Idaho Code Ann. § 72-601 (1949).
38 See Cooper, "The Admissibility of Hearsay in Hearings Before Workmen's Compensa-
tion Commissions," 31 Dicta 423, 425 (1954). In Alabama and Louisiana, however, the
merits of a disputed workmen's compensation claim are dedded in the courts. See Ala. Code
fit. 26, § 297 (1958); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:1311 (1964).
39 But see Note, "Improper Evidence in Nonjury Trials: Basis for Reversal?" 79 Harv.
L. Rev. 407 (1965), where it is suggested that this might not be the case in nonjury court
trials. "There are situations in which a judge by virtue of his experience in conducting trials,
may have superior fact finding capacities." Id. at 413.
40 See Sada v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 11 Cal. 2d 263, 78 P.2d 1127 (1938); cases cited
in 2 Larson, supra note 34, § 79.21 n.13 and accompanying text.
41 2 Larson, supra note 34, § 79.22.
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can be made.42 Under a third rule admission of hearsay is nonreversible error,
but the award must be reversed where it appears that it would not have been
made if such evidence had not been considered. 43 Such a rule fully negates the
liberalizing purpose behind the workmen's compensation legislation.
The "residuum" doctrine has been under attack by legal scholars, who claim
that hearsay alone should be able to support a compensation award if the
evidence would satisfy a reasonable mind.44 The commissioner, because of his
expertise, has the ability to separate hearsay which is worthless rumor or gossip
from "persuasive hearsay. ' 45 Sometimes the courts which follow this majority
rule have even "seized at straws to find that all-important 'residuum.' 46
Certainly, then, when the medical book is used only to support the opinions of
an expert witness in a workmen's compensation proceeding, it seems that the
opinion of the expert would constitute enough evidence to sustain or deny an
award. Therefore, even under the majority or residuum rule, since the opinion
of the expert himself would provide the residuum of legal evidence capable of
sustaining the grant or denial of an award, reading from a treatise should not
constitute error.
CONCLUSION
While the rule against hearsay evidence may have a valid application to the
reading of medical treatises, there are some situations in which such reading is
justifiable. Two factors-the method of presentation and the nature of the
proceeding in which the introduction is attempted-will affect the need for
42 See Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 113 N.E. 507 (1916); cases cited
in 2 Larson, supra note 34, § 79.21 n.14 and accompanying text.
43 See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Nelson, 384 P.2d 914 (Okla. 1963); Sligh v. New-
berry Elec. Co-op., Inc., 216 S.C. 401, 58 S.E.2d 675 (1950); Frier v. South Carolina
Penitentiary, 216 S.C. 84, 56 S.E.2d 752 (1949); Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Gregory,
206 Tenn. 525, 334 S.W.2d 939 (1960); 2 Larson, supra note 34, § 79.21 n.15 and accom-
panying text. No state expressly holds that admission of hearsay evidence in a workmen's
compensation proceeding is in itself reversible error. 2 Larson, supra note 34, § 79.21 n.16
and accompanying text. In Davis v. Arkansas Best Freight Sys., Inc., 393 S.W.2d 237 (Ark.
1965), the opinion of the high court of Arkansas did not consider the "residuum" question
or the question of whether or not there had been any reliance by the referee or full com-
mission on the hearsay evidence. The court may have assumed such reliance, but it is also
possible it considered the question irrelevant. If the latter is the case, Arkansas may be the
only state holding the mere introduction of hearsay into a workmen's compensation pro-
ceeding reversible error.
44 See 1 Wigmore, supra note 2, § 4(b), at 39; Horovitz, supra note 35, at 241; 2 Larson,
supra note 34, § 79.22. Compare Administrative Procedure Act § 7(c), 60 Stat. 241 (1946),
5 U.S.C. § 1006 (1964), which permits a finding to be based solely on hearsay, with Model
State Administrative Procedure Act § 12(7) (e), which permits reversal if administrative find-
ings are "unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in view of the entire
record as submitted." See 2 Larson, supra note 34, § 79.22 nn.18-19.
In Davis, "Hearsay in Administrative Hearings," 32 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 689, 697 (1964),
it is stated:
The hearsay rule is designed to govern admission or exclusion of evidence in a jury
case. The residuum rule, as applied by the state courts that tend to follow it, governs
evaluation of evidence in a non-jury case. . . . [T]he alternative to the residuum
rule is not to make findings on the basis of unreliable evidence. The alternative is to
use discretion about whether or not the particular evidence is reliable and then, if
circumstances warrant, to rely upon it.
45 See 2 Larson, supra note 34, § 79.23; cf. Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp. v. FTC, 139 F.2d
393, 397 (2d Cir. 1943).
46 Horovitz, supra note 35, at 241. See Altschuler v. Bressler, 289 N.Y. 463, 46 N.E.2d
886 (1943).
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